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The textile firm and the management of labour:  
Comparative perspectives on the global textile industry since c 1700 
Arthur McIvor (University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland) 
 
Introduction 
Recently, the scope of labour history has widened to incorporate the study of 
employers, firms and management and there has been a sharper recognition of the 
need to critically analyse the nature of capitalism in order to understand social and 
labour relations. Research on the behaviour of firms has demonstrated a far more 
complex vision of the importance of different management policies and practices over 
time, divisions between different factions of capital, the often contradictory nature of 
employer strategy and the close interaction between capital and labour, resulting in a 
more nuanced and diverse history of workplace relations across time and space.1  
However, while the historical studies of employers within particular country settings 
has increased, international comparative historical analysis of employer practice has 
been rare. Such approaches are important in developing theoretical conceptions of 
employer practice beyond the contexts of specific national economic settings. Two 
studies which stand out in this respect are Littler’s The Development of the Labour 
Process in Capitalist Societies and Tolliday and Zeitlin’s edited volume The Power to 
Manage? Both provide historical and comparative analysis of employer policy and 
practice in a range of different country settings. A key finding from these studies is 
that rather than a single means of capitalist control, employers have diverged 
significantly between countries in their labour management policies as well as in the 
timing of the evolution of control from indirect, simple and more coercive means to 
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more sophisticated, bureaucratic and consensual practices. Moreover, what these 
comparative studies reveal is a more complex interpretation of factors which have 
shaped such variation, with both economic contexts and differing institutional 
environments playing important roles in shaping employer strategies and behaviour.2 
 
This paper focuses on the textile firm, providing a comparative examination of the 
changing patterns of organisation and behaviour amongst employers, managers, and 
others who controlled production in global textile manufacture since c 1700. Attention 
is concentrated on five issues: The first section explores labour control mechanisms 
within pre-industrial and proto-industrial modes of production, examining home-
work, artisan and guild textile manufacture, together with the role of merchants in the 
‘putting-out’ system. The second section investigates the textile firm in the era of the 
modern, mechanised factory system and the evolution of more direct and frequently 
authoritarian work regimes, tempered in some cases by traditions of company 
paternalism. The third section explores the responses of textile firms to the challenge 
of trade unionism and organised workers’ protest movements, including the role 
played by employers’ organisations in industrial relations, supported, in some cases, 
by the state. The fourth section evaluates the key changes in managerial practice in 
the textile firm associated with scientific management and the bureaucratisation of 
work in the twentieth century and the extent to which the textiles sector shared in this 
‘managerial revolution’. The final section makes some brief comments about 
international and multinational textile firms.  
 
 
1. The guild and merchant era: From home-working to ‘putting out’. 
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Throughout much of the world through most of the period under review the spinning 
and weaving of cloth has taken place within the home, as a primary activity or as a 
supplementary craft undertaken by family members whose main livelihood came from 
working the land. Within this system, the obtaining of raw materials, the supervision 
and management of the labour process, the maintenance of the basic technology (such 
as the spinning jenny or the loom) and the distribution of the final product (where 
there was a surplus beyond the needs of the family) frequently lay in the hands of the 
workers themselves. A high level of workers’ control and autonomy thus existed over 
the pace and rhythm of work, epitomised, perhaps in the tradition within much of 
Western Europe of taking a rest day on ‘St Monday’. Within this mode of production 
we know very little about the exercise of authority and control, though it appears that 
social relations varied within the family unit, ranging from matriarchal dominance in 
some countries through to the more dominant West European and Islamic country 
norm of patriarchal control. In the latter, the sexual division of labour normally saw 
men responsible for strategic decision-making and undertaking the weaving processes 
and women and children in subordinate positions, doing the carding and spinning.  
 
In urban centres in the 17th and 18th centuries, textile production was frequently 
regulated by associations of artisans who, together with the merchants, exercised 
varying degrees of power within town councils. The guilds of wool, cotton and silk 
spinners and weavers typically operated to protect the interests of the textile artisans 
by restricting entry to the craft and fixing product prices. In some places guilds 
imposed strict apprenticeship regulations laying down training and probationary 
periods of up to 10 years and used their political influence to introduce licensing laws 
to forbid ‘interlopers’ from the trade, with fines and imprisonment acting as 
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deterrents. In the urban centres, textile production thus increasingly took place in 
small workshops owned by a master craftsman or merchant who employed a handful 
of journeymen or ‘probationers’ and the requisite number of apprentices. Often the 
latter would have been kin. Again, we know little of the internal dynamics of the 
medieval textile workshops. Apprentices though appear to have been subject to a very 
strict regulatory regime as they learnt the trade, but when fully-trained artisans they 
exercised a great deal of autonomy and independence over their work hours and pace 
of production within what appears to have been very loose managerial control 
structures. The extent of ‘responsible autonomy’ reflected medieval values such as the 
exaltation of skill, ‘community’ and distrust of competition. Vertical integration also 
characterised this mode of production in that the guilds were usually associations of 
both the craft masters and the fully trained artisans. Whilst predominant in Europe, 
the guild system was widely exported to European colonies.3  Guild control began to 
erode in the 18th century in Britain, though in other areas of the world – such as the 
Middle East - the system survived intact well into the twentieth century. In Egypt, for 
example, urban textile production was dominated by artisans working in small 
workshops (typically employing 3-4 workers, often kin), controlled by the urban 
guilds (with Cairo dominating production) well into the twentieth century.4  
 
Commonly merchants were also involved in textile production in the 17th and 18th 
centuries, developing what was known as the ‘putting out’ (or contracting out) 
system. There were various forms of such decentralised manufacture worldwide, 
though typically it involved a merchant purchasing raw material in bulk and arranging 
to distribute it to homeworkers and to workshops to be spun and woven, with the final 
product then being uplifted by the merchant for selling on. In Spain, such a system of 
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atomised production was referred to as ‘industrialists without factories’. 5   In the 
Netherlands, this involved merchants ‘putting out’ raw material for manufacture to the 
family farms largely in the Twente district.6  Such merchants appear to have rarely 
interfered directly in the labour process itself and the workers typically retained a 
great deal of discretion and control over the rhythm of work within a system 
constrained mainly by the imperatives of completing the task. However, in some 
cases, merchants extended control through the provision of machinery (sometimes 
rented by the workers) and through the provision of credit which could lead to 
spiralling indebtedness, as in Russia and Mexico.7  In Turkey, the merchants came to 
directly control textile workshops in places like Damascus, Nablus and Mosul 
imposing direct forms of supervision over the work.8  In areas of South America and 
in Tsarist Russia such contracting out involved more coercive regimes, where forced 
or ‘bonded’ labour was employed.9  In Brazil, Portugese colonists controlled textile 
production using black slaves in supplementary production on large sugar and tea 
plantations prior to the abolition of slavery there in 1888.10 
 
Homeworking, the guild system and merchant-controlled contracting systems 
prevailed in many countries well into the twentieth century. As Beinin has 
commented, where labour and food were cheap there remained little incentive to 
mechanise production or move to more sophisticated managerial techniques. 11  In 
India in the 1930s, for example, the textile factories employed around half a million 
whilst there were several million hand loom weavers12  Similarly, in China household 
based production and ‘putting-out’ predominated well into the twentieth century – 
indeed effectively until the communist era, when rapid, state initiated industrialisation 
over two decades replaced handicraft methods with modern, factory-based production 
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of textiles.13  For the merchants, such a system had distinct advantages, involving 
relatively little capital investment in fixed plant and machinery, maximum flexibility, 
low levels of risk and the option to allow workers to manage themselves.  
 
 
2. Mechanised textile firms and the real subordination of labour? 
Textile manufacture was the first sector to make the transition to mechanised factory 
production, initially in the United Kingdom, and this mode of production involved 
quite different social relations and structures of authority and control. Undoubtedly, 
the development of the capitalist labour process, as Marx hypothesised, facilitated 
greater degrees of subordination over labour as machines deskilled work, factory 
owners and overseers imposed draconian discipline over their workers (what Marx 
termed ‘despotic’ control) and, to varying degrees, governments supported or 
colluded in such intensified exploitation. However, in reality this was a complex and 
uneven process and there is now much debate over the validity of Marxist labour 
process theory. Disagreements exist over the timing and extent of transformations in 
authority and control at work at a number of levels, not least amongst those scholars 
influenced by Marxist ideas. 14   Recent work suggests that it would be wrong to 
assume that the factory system necessarily involved a change from indirect to direct 
forms of supervision and control.15 Moreover, the process of industrialisation is now 
recognised to be much more uneven than was once imagined – hence ‘traditional’ 
modes of work organisation and control persisted and frequently proliferated in 
tandem with an emerging modernised sector. It follows that employers were not as 
omnipotent, united or as empowered as the orthodox Marxist model suggests, nor 
workers as powerless. Comparative analyses across countries (such as this project) 
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throw up evidence of common patterns of employer strategies and managerial 
practices but also highlight a rich mosaic of experience at any given point in time 
across global textile production within different cultural and institutional contexts. 
 
Nonetheless, with higher levels of capital investment in machinery and in the 
provision of work space (workshop or factory), textile firms increasingly came to 
expect greater degrees of control over labour. Sharpened notions of employers’ right 
(or ‘prerogative’) to manage emerged with the factory system and this was 
encapsulated in more coercive modes of supervision through overseers, foremen and 
plant managers. The rather loose and informal monitoring of the labour process 
common in homework and the workshop gave way to tighter discipline and control – 
as E.P. Thompson famously hypothesised from the English case, irregular ‘task’-
based work gave way to regularised time discipline, with the factory clock (or bell) 
determining the work day. 16  Moreover, what was new was that the speed of the 
power-driven machines determined to a large extent (though not fully) the pace of 
work. Whilst technical control was taken to a more sophisticated level by Henry Ford, 
it was pioneered in cotton textile factories. The new textile factory regimes were thus 
blatantly more exploitative (for e.g. of child labour), especially in the early 
unregulated phase of textile factory development (in the UK through to the 1830s, and 
elsewhere frequently until late into the nineteenth century and even beyond). Thus, 
traumatic injury rates were extremely high in the early phases of mechanised factory 
production, as were long-term chronic industrial diseases associated with textile 
production, such as respiratory disability (especially in the dustiest preparatory 
processes in the card and blowing rooms). The maximisation of profits within such 
factory regimes invariably damaged workers’ bodies to a lesser or greater degree.17  
 7
 Coercive modes of control dominated this early phase of factory-based textile 
production. However, the authority of the firm could and frequently was challenged, 
rather than passively accepted by the workers. The USA provides a good example of 
the shifting frontier of control in factory textile production in the nineteenth century, 
the contested nature of authority in the mills and, ultimately, the capacity of owners 
and managers to impose their will upon mill workers. Blewett emphasises the way in 
which US millowners successfully exploited divisions within the labour force based 
on ethnicity, religion, race and gender in both the traditional sector in New England 
and in the emerging sector in the southern states. 18  In response to trade union 
organisation, strikes and protest, millowners countered with draconian tactics, 
including widespread use of the lock-out, blacklisting, victimisation and the use of 
anti-trade union contracts. U.S. millowners in the main refused to bargain collectively 
with unions and insisted on their unilateral right to manage their mills without 
‘interference’, as they thought fit. Consequently, they rejected any open scrutiny of 
the order books as a breach of their sacrosanct prerogative to manage their businesses. 
Yarn and cloth were also stockpiled as a safeguard against strikes, whilst the growth 
of state intervention (for example in Massachusetts with the 1874 Factory Code) in 
the late nineteenth century was widely ignored. In the 19th century US textile mills, an 
authoritarian employer regime of fear and intimidation appears to have prevailed 
across most of the sector, though there did exist a significant paternalist strand of 
family-owned companies in Philadelphia engaged in higher quality, specialised batch 
production where more consensual social relations largely prevailed.19  The latter 
perhaps illustrates the point pressed strongly by Gospel (after Chandler) that product 
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markets, labour markets and company structures significantly influenced employers’ 
labour relations policies.20 
 
In the UK, and other Western European countries, this struggle for control at work 
was less one-sided and the dominance of textile firms never assured and ultimately 
subject to mediation due to sustained worker organisation and protest. Here social 
control mechanisms developed by the firm were invariably more flexible and more 
diverse. In some regions, the discipline of the firm remained relatively loose. In 
Barcelona, artisanal autonomy prevailed in the late nineteenth century, with male 
spinners controlling the technology, curtailing the employment of female labour and 
winning concessions including the right to smoke and drink on the job and to start 
work after five minutes ‘leeway’21 Paternalist modes of control also persisted in many 
textile firms across Europe where employers strove to dominate social relations 
within the wider community as well as within the mill, attempting to cement workers’ 
sense of loyalty and attachment to the firm through the provision of a wide range of 
benefits beyond the wage. The company welfare ‘package’ could include the 
provision of accommodation, schools, shops, community halls, parks and playing 
fields, as well as company pensions and other forms of social insurance, such as sick 
pay and ad hoc accident compensation. Joyce has shown such factory regimes to be 
prevalent in cotton and wool manufacture in northern England in the Victorian period, 
and such company paternalism persisted longer in the Coats mills in Paisley, 
Scotland.22 Again, the influence of product markets, labour markets and company 
structures are evident in the determination of firms’ choices. Textile company 
paternalism appears to have developed deepest roots in more isolated rural settings 
(where a labour force had to be attracted and retained), where family-ownership 
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prevailed (as in Bolton, England and Paisley, Scotland) and where the firm produced 
finer, quality or specialised products, monopolising markets (such as thread 
manufacture by Coats), or at least where competition was less fierce. At one extreme, 
this could produce a much more humanitarian factory regime, as with the New Lanark 
mills in Scotland during the managerial era of the communitarian Robert Owen and at 
the Amoskeag mills in New Hampshire, USA in the nineteenth century.23 At the other 
extreme, paternalist control could be overbearingly despotic, as with the textile mill 
dynasties in the Twente region of the Netherlands, epitomised perhaps by Jacob 
Spanjaard in the early twentieth century, dubbed ‘the god of Borne’24 and in early 
twentieth century rural mills in Catalonia, where such control could extend even to the 
banning of left-wing literature.25 Nor was such company paternalism solely a Western 
phenomena. There was a strong tradition of welfarism in Japan where the provision of 
housing and education were well-established strategies by the late nineteenth century 
textile firm for managing a largely female labour force.26  
 
In Asia and South America, in different cultural settings and especially where workers 
rights were limited and traditions of democratic government weak or non-existent, 
textile factory regimes could be notably more draconian, fitting more closely, perhaps, 
the Marxian model of ‘despotic’ control. In some countries, state ownership of textile 
firms in the nineteenth century facilitated autocratic modes of control. Egypt provides 
an example where textile workers organised in guilds retained a considerable degree 
of control over the labour process in the state-owned factories in the early/mid-
nineteenth century, but the armed forces were used to ensure the forced labour 
remained in the mills.27  Textile firms in colonial regimes could use forced and slave 
labour, as in Brazil where the labour force consisted of a mix of slaves and free wage 
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labour toiling for up to a 17 hour day in the 1880s frequently under the control of 
English managers. 28   In Mexico before independence (1811) Indian and ‘unfree’ 
labour worked in urban obrajes (larger workshops) under the repressive authority of 
Spanish businessmen and supervisors (one such firm was described as ‘a dark 
prison’).29 Autocratic control and domination continued to characterise the mills in 
Mexico City through the nineteenth century, with long 15 hour work days imposed 
upon ‘Mexican and dark-skinned’ workers by company owners who were mostly 
‘foreign and white’. 30  Elsewhere, as in Shanghai before the Second World War, 
textile firms practically enslaved a largely young, female workforce recruited from the 
countryside, housing them in squalid dormitories and imposing military-style 
discipline upon them. Bribery and corruption permeated China’s main textile centre in 
Shanghai, with textile firms acquiescing in the control that organised crime (the Green 
Gang) exercised over labour recruitment (‘buying’ single women on contracts of 1-3 
years).31  
 
Late-nineteenth century Russia provides, perhaps, an archetypal example of coercive 
control within textile production. Mechanised cotton manufacture developed rapidly 
from the early 1840s, in part through the sponsorship of the Tsarist state, and became 
very concentrated geographically with a relatively small number of very large plants 
employing over 1,000 workers. As Dave Pretty has shown, draconian factory regimes 
characterised by over-bearing supervision, complex fining systems for indiscipline 
and the widespread employment of child labour prevailed.32 The autocratic authority 
and control structures of the firm in Russia were also bolstered by a repressive state, 
where trade union organisation and strikes remained illegal until 1905. Transgressors 
could find themselves exiled to Siberia. Textile firms maximised profits in this period 
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by increasing the monitoring of workers, ignoring the weak and ineffectual factory 
legislation that was introduced (for example in Factory Acts in 1885 and 1897), 
extending payments by results wage payment systems, rate-cutting and increasingly 
replacing more expensive male textile workers with women. Tight control over labour 
costs was deemed imperative by the autocratic family dynasties in Russia who ran 
these giant textile corporations, necessitated by their dependency upon less efficient 
technology and low profit margins. The extent to which textile workers were central 
to the strike waves and revolutionary ferment in Russia from 1905-17 owes much, as 
Pretty has demonstrated, to such a volatile, provocative and alienating combination of 
workplace and civil repression.33  
 
All this is not to suggest, however, that factory regimes were necessarily worse in the 
largest firms. In several countries evidence indicates that it was the smaller textile 
firms, trying to compete on the margin, where conditions were worse, local and state 
labour codes were subverted and the work impacted most critically upon the bodies of 
employees. 34   Some of the larger firms were also notably paternalistic, even in 
countries where repressive modes of control dominated, such as Brazil.35  However, 
relatively speaking there only appears to have been a very thin strand of genuinely 
welfarist textile firms scattered across the industry globally in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Where corporate paternalism was most developed, perhaps, was 
in Japan where textile firms pioneered a distinctively welfarist labour management 
strategy – with state support – as an alternative to class confrontation in Western 
capitalism. The example set by textile firms congealed into a more widespread 
paternalist managerial philosophy in Japan in the twentieth century.36 
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3. Rising to the challenge of the trade unions: Organised capital in textiles 
Textile firms across the globe showed varying tendencies to organise together, often 
playing important roles within national employers’ movements in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. The cementing pressures that drew millowners away from their 
traditional ‘rugged individualism’ towards a sharpened sense of class consciousness 
exhibited in collective organisation and co-ordinated action also differed markedly in 
different contexts. However, there appear to be three primary interlocutors: the rise of 
trade union organisation and worker militancy; government intervention in matters 
which impinged upon profitability in textile manufacture; and, finally, changes in 
market conditions – usually associated with perceived or actual loss of market share. 
Where much debate continues to rage, however, relates to just how powerful and 
united employers were. One view, based largely on Marx, defines employers as 
omnipotent and united in ruthless pursuit of their class interests. An alternative 
‘revisionist’ interpretation stresses the relative weakness of employers in the face of 
organised labour and their inability to combine together to impose their will. Here 
centripetal as well as centrifugal tendencies are recognised. Like other employers, 
textile firms were divided by their competitive relationship with one another, by 
differences in company structures and styles of management and by diverging product 
markets in different fibres, yarn and cloth qualities. 37  Nonetheless, what appears 
evident from this comparative survey of textile firm behaviour across a number of 
countries is just how prevalent and effective collective activity by firms could be in 
neutralising the challenge from organised labour. 
 
Amongst the earliest examples of collective organisation amongst textile firms can be 
found in the UK. In the 1740s and 1750s cotton textile merchants and manufacturers 
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in the Manchester region combined together, firstly to force a reduction in wages and 
subsequently to deal with a strike of checkweavers.38 Over the following century, as 
industrialisation developed, a tapestry of local town-centred employers’ associations 
emerged in Northern England and Central Scotland. The Glasgow Master Spinners’ 
Association and the Oldham Cotton Masters’ Association – in permanent existence 
from the 1830s – provide archetypal examples. Prior to the middle of the nineteenth 
century the labour relations strategies of such nascent textile firm associations were 
blatantly coercive. Firms came together to provide a united front to preserve 
managerial prerogatives where companies felt such threatened by the ‘encroachments’ 
of worker militancy and trade union formation. In essence this was a struggle over the 
distribution of power and in this early period the textile employers’ organisations 
mustered an impressive array of weapons against the unions. These included use of 
the lock-out to widen the area of struggle, neutralise the unions’ use of the selective 
strike tactic and literally starve workers into submission. This would typically be 
supplemented with attempts to replace recalcitrant workforces with non-unionist, 
‘blackleg’ labour and various methods of victimising strikers and labour activists, 
ranging from enquiry and discharge notes to character referencing systems and formal 
blacklisting to prevent troublemakers getting work elsewhere. Moreover, such 
strikebreaking methods were usually sanctioned by the state and the law courts, 
creating an environment of fear and intimidation which could castrate early attempts 
to unionise textile workforces. By the end of the nineteenth century cotton textile 
firms in the UK were very well organised with both the associations of master 
spinners and master weavers recruiting over half of the machine capacity in the 
industry.  
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Whilst divisions between millowners remained significant, collective organisation 
empowered textile firms, with the early phases of the employers’ movement often 
characterised by inflexible and confrontational labour relations strategies. In Mexico, 
for example, when workers went on strike to reform draconian work regimes in 1906, 
textile firms organised together to form an association and to lock-out the entire 
industry in a particularly bloody confrontation. The companies had the support of the 
Diaz government who imposed a settlement favourable to the bosses and ordered 
troops to disperse strikers in Orizaba, leading to the killing of ‘scores’ of strikers. This 
succeeded in maintaining unilateral managerial authority in the Mexican textile mills, 
at least until Diaz was opposed in the Revolution of 1911.39 In the Netherlands, the 
late 1880s saw the emergence of particularly aggressive textile manufacturers’ 
associations in the Twente region who used the lock-out weapon effectively to 
undermine the textile trade unions in the two decades or so before World War One.40 
In the early years of the interwar depression the Netherlands Textile Employers’ 
Federation went on to spearhead a costs’ reduction drive which included a 10% wage 
cut and a rise in work hours from a 48 to a 53 hour working week. In Spain, Catalan 
industrialists combined in the last quarter of the nineteenth century to counter a strong 
and militant tradition of craft organisation in textiles. Amongst their tactics were 
heavy use of the lock-out weapon and exploitation of their political muscle in a period 
of Conservative government in Catalonia. The outcome was a phase of work 
intensification, deteriorating wages and work conditions for textile workers in 
Barcelona from the 1870s and a resurgence of strict labour discipline in the mills.41  
Similarly in Japan the collective organisation of the largest textile companies (in the 
Japan Spinners’ Association) significantly bolstered the capability of textile firms to 
keep unions out of the workplace and retain company-level bargaining and largely 
 15
authoritarian paternalistic work regimes up to the 1940s.42 In Egypt, the repression of 
trade unions lasted even longer with employers organising together to impose 
crippling lock-outs to destroy any attempt by workers to organise. As Beinin has 
shown, the 1938 textile lock-out in Egypt led to the arrest of around 100 strike leaders 
and the imprisonment of 50, and was followed by the reorganisation of the industry 
into smaller workshops to neuter trade union power.43 The persistence of unilateral 
managerial control in textile firms in Egypt is indicated in contemporary labour 
relations, where company unions prevail, some workers are working on only three 
month recruitment contracts and others are required to sign undated letters of 
resignation when they are hired to facilitate instant dismissal.44  As the author notes, 
these authoritarian responses typify a country with an abundant labour supply and a 
textile industry attempting to compete using older technologies and work methods 
against more developed and technically superior competitors. To an extent the same 
was true of late Tsarist Russia, though here the responses of textile firms to the 
growth of trade unions and strikes from 1870 to the 1910s was particularly atomised, 
with little evidence of employer collusion or formal association.45 
 
Such coercive modes of control by textile firms and their collective organisations 
gave way over the course of time in many countries – and especially in the developed 
economies of Western Europe – to increasing levels of collaboration with the trade 
unions. Experimentation with ‘corporatist’ or procedural forms of control superseded 
coercive methods in the West. The textile employers’ associations frequently played a 
key role in this institutionalisation of industrial relations. In part this was a rational 
response to the growing capacity of textile workers to get organised, as well as their 
increasing propensity to successfully exploit the strike weapon. In some countries, 
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such as Mexico, this transition was precipitated by political change and characterised 
by much violence. The Mexican Revolution of 1911 marked a watershed in textile 
firms’ autocratic factory regimes with the textile unions exploiting the opportunity to 
challenge managerial authority and win reformed labour codes, including industry-
wide collective bargaining, enshrined in the Labour Contract of 1927.46 Symbolic of 
this erosion in the authority of Mexican textile firms was their failure to reverse this 
extension of workers’ control in this period in the law courts. 
 
In countries such as the UK a symbiotic relationship between the unions and the 
employers’ associations developed from the late nineteenth century and the 
transmogrification of labour relations towards ‘corporatist’ accommodation occurred 
more peacefully. Each side fed off one another with the trade unions and employers’ 
movements growing largely in tandem. Recent research has shown the extent to 
which workers were an agency here (rather than powerless victims) and how flexible 
and adaptive firms were in reacting to changed circumstances (such as times of full 
employment and periods of war such as 1914-18), developing more sophisticated 
control mechanisms or simply making the best out of prevailing power relations. For 
some, this involved attempting to incorporate unions into bureaucratic systems and 
use unions to police their own members. This was most evident, perhaps, in the 
emergence of national wage bargaining agreements and stage-by-stage disputes 
procedures whereby no strikes or lock-outs were permitted until formal discussions 
had been exhausted. However, the pace of change differed across and even within 
countries. In Great Britain, for example, Fowler has shown how the generally larger 
firms in the wool and worsted sector in Yorkshire widely employed female labour and 
succeeded in largely keeping trade unions out of the workplace before World War 
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One, in marked contrast to the experience in cotton textile firms in Lancashire.47  
Scotland followed a similar pattern so that in both Yorkshire and Scotland levels of 
collective organisation amongst firms were weak and collective bargaining poorly 
developed in contrast to Lancashire.48 
 
For textile firms, these ‘corporatist’ methods acted as an alternative labour control 
strategy and could be extremely effective in the twentieth century in containing the 
challenge of labour. The Netherlands, Denmark and the UK provide examples. 49  
Sometimes, as in Britain, Denmark and Japan, these institutionalised arrangements for 
dealing with industrial relations followed major confrontations between capital and 
labour in textiles. In Denmark, formal industry-wide collective bargaining came in 
1898 after a nation-wide industry lock-out for three months in which the Copenhagen 
textile association amalgamated with provincial manufacturers. The so-called 
‘September Compromise’ which emerged saw the employers recognising the unions 
right to bargain collectively, whilst the unions accepted the employers’ sacrosanct 
prerogative to manage their own workplaces without interference.50 In Japan, annual 
collective bargaining in textiles spread following an infamous, bitter strike in 1954 at 
the Omi Kenshi works – a notoriously autocratic employer.51  As workers became 
better organised across the global textile industry in the twentieth century, textile 
firms and their associations were invariably forced to give ground and concede 
degrees of worker participation in the determination of wages and conditions of 
employment. At the extreme, this could significantly curtail textile firms’ ability to 
introduce new technology or changes in work organisation, such as increasing the 
ratio of looms operated per worker.52 However, outcomes of such struggles over the 
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organisation of work differed markedly across different countries and even in 
different sections of textile manufacture within countries. 
 
4. ‘Scientific’ management and the bureaucratisation of work in textile firms 
The extent of delegation of labour control to employers’ associations differed 
significantly across the global textile industry. In many countries firms remained the 
primary locus of employer power and traditions of collective activity were transitory 
and at best apparent only in periods of crisis. Russia would be an example. Elsewhere, 
whilst employers’ associations dealt with labour contract issues, such as wages, work 
hours and conditions, firms retained much autonomy over the organisation of 
production, including the introduction of new technology and management systems, 
such as Taylorism (e.g. U.S.A. and Japan). In some cases in the twentieth century the 
initiative in labour management and personnel policy was shifted back from the 
collective organisations to the individual textile firms. This was evident in the UK and 
other Western European countries, with the declining membership and eroding 
importance of the textile employers’ associations from the 1930s on. 53  These 
developments accelerated in the second half of the twentieth century and were also 
associated with changes in company structures in an era of textile multi-nationals, 
globalisation and in the pervading bureaucratisation of work in textiles worldwide. In 
short, textile firms were increasingly moving from indirect forms of labour 
management, including putting-out, internal-sub contracting and external delegation 
to employers’ organisations towards more direct forms of recruiting, controlling and 
managing their labour forces within the firm. 
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These tendencies in the behaviour of firms were evident earliest, perhaps, in the USA, 
the birthplace of the architect of ‘modern’ scientific management, Frederick Winslow 
Taylor. Taylorism essentially challenged employers to directly manage their labour, to 
discover how the work was done through time study (using the stop watch), then to 
reorganise production to benefit from maximum division of labour. In the process, 
craft unionism was undermined as work was progressively de-skilled and down-
graded. In the U.S.A. and in Western Europe one of the main mechanisms used by 
textile firms to implement Taylorism after World War One was the Bedaux system. In 
his study of the bureaucratisation of work Littler has shown how a significant number 
of textile firms brought in the Bedaux management consultants as a precursor to 
radical reorganisation of the labour process.54 It is likely, however, that many more 
firms experimented with elements of scientific management whilst eschewing the 
whole package and sometimes the expense of bringing in outside agencies such as 
Bedaux.  
 
The extent, timing and pace of this internal management revolution differed 
significantly, however, across the textile industry globally. Textile firms operating in 
overstocked labour markets (such as in Egypt and India), or where forced labour 
persisted (such as in China) had little incentive to either introduce new technologies 
or such costly (and sometimes provocative) reorganisations of work. Moreover, as 
Chandarvarkar has argued, divisions within the employers ranks in Bombay (the 
premier cotton textile city in India) prevented a common front and undermined the 
rationalisation of work drive in the inter-war years.55 Such divisions within textile 
capitalism undoubtedly constrained managerial work reorganisation elsewhere.  
Conversely, scientific management spread rapidly in the USA and areas of US 
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economic influence after the Second World War (including Germany and Japan). 
Elsewhere, managerial complacency and poor systems of management education 
retarded the spread of new ideas on personnel management, including in the UK 
textile manufacturing sector. It was not until well after World War Two that work 
study was taken up in earnest in British textile firms, a factor which contributed in no 
small measure to the sharp contraction of the industry from the 1920s.  
 
Moreover, the managerial revolution associated with Taylorism did not occur within 
textile firms in a vacuum in the twentieth century. The capacity of textile firms to 
introduce and sustain such sophisticated systems of labour control depended upon a 
range of variables, including prevailing enterprise culture, the structure of the firm, 
the nature of product and labour markets, the attitudes of labour and unions, and other 
contingent circumstances, such as the attitude of state agencies and war. Importantly, 
some firms chose not to initiate such changes, preferring systems of responsible 
worker autonomy or negotiated and agreed evolutions in labour processes. In the 
Netherlands it was the Second World War and post-war labour shortages that 
provided the key stimulus to the bureaucratisation of work in textile firms, but this 
was initiated within a context of worker participation and joint consultation, with the 
pill sweetened by a significant extension in company welfarism.56 The process also 
occurred more rapidly in the Netherlands in the cotton sector (based in Twente) than 
in wool manufacturing (centred around Tilburg). In Japan, scientific management was 
grafted on to a pre-existing and deep-rooted commitment to corporate paternalism, 
with the latter largely surviving intact in Japan in contrast to the U.S.A. where welfare 
capitalism atrophied from the 1920s and Taylorism largely triumphed. This success of 
American capitalism was the product not just of distinctive proprietorial and anti-
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union cultural values, but also the economic and political resources that U.S. firms 
could muster to neutralise trade unionism and facilitate a thorough-going 
transformation of work organisation and control. 57  The sheer size of US textile 
companies represented an enormous conglomeration of power in itself: the average 
unit size of US textile firms by the 1970s was almost ten times the West European 
average.58 By 1980, only around 7% of US textile workers were unionised.59 Where 
trade unions were powerful and militant, however, the imposition of Taylorism, 
through Bedaux or other guises, could be fiercely contested, either officially, or 
through militant rank-and-file protest.  
 
The outcomes of such skirmishes across the fluid and ever-changing managerial 
frontier of control differed widely. In South America, the Bedaux system appears to 
have spread into textile firms most extensively. In Argentina, the Textile Employers’ 
Confederation spearheaded the drive to rationalise work. This led to a massive 
confrontation with the unions in 1959-60 over the introduction of time and motion 
studies, culminating in the sacking wholesale of strike committees, worker take-overs 
of plants and the drafting in of the police to break up strikes. The resulting 1961 
Productivity Agreement sealed the employers victory and opened the way to 
unrestricted exploitation of Taylorite work systems in Argentina. These developments 
were endorsed after the right-wing military coup in 1976 which saw militant trade 
unions outlawed and employers power consolidated.60 A similar if somewhat less 
bloody process unfolded in Uruguay where the major textile companies in wool and 
cotton introduced Taylorism after 1918, resulting in fundamental changes in work 
organisation. Amongst the changes were a marked rise in the degree of monitoring, 
with the ratio of supervisors and planners to production line workers increasing 
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rapidly. The collective agreement struck in 1988 registered the power of textile 
employers in Uruguay to manage their firms as they thought fit, without any 
interference from the unions, especially in the sphere of work organisation and 
production.61  
 
However, in a number of cases employer innovations and ‘scientific’ managerial 
systems were moderated by organised labour, resulting in a more humanised 
production regime. This happened, for example, in countries such as Denmark and the 
UK in relation to the ‘more looms’ issue in the period 1920-50. However, Denmark 
also provides a good example of how collective bargaining could undermine labour 
resistance to the rationalisation of work. In a renowned ‘unofficial’ strike at the 
Silkeborg mill in 1934 the Textile Union disowned strikers, refused benefits and 
ultimately expelled all strikers from membership. Whilst negotiations ensued, the 
break-down in discussions left management open to introduce the Bedaux system on 
their terms, with the union counselling workers to obediently follow the orders of 
management.62 
 
Therefore, it would be wrong to interpret the spread of scientific management and 
‘rationalisation’ as entirely unproblematic, inevitable, or, indeed, as the most 
advanced weapon in the armoury of modern-day competitive capitalism. Moreover, it 
was not only the developed capitalist economies of the West that utilised such 
methods, but also some of the underdeveloped capitalist economies and centrally 
planned economies. Of the latter, the USSR stands out as a major protagonist for 
Taylorism, counting amongst its strongest supporters none other than Lenin in the 
early 1920s. Furthermore, in the West, including in Britain and the USA, textile firms 
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operating in declining markets were as likely to pursue traditional modes of 
intensifying work, as to embark fully on a systematic programme of work study and 
reorganisation. In other words, continuities in labour management strategies are 
evident as well as mutations over time. The Boott Cotton Mills in Lowell 
Massachusetts provide an example of such a company which commissioned but never 
implemented a Taylorite efficiency survey in the 1900s, continuing thereafter to 
squeeze labour costs using traditional methods. The outcome was a deterioration in 
work conditions and wages which may have exceeded anything that scientific 
management would have achieved.63 
 
5. The textile multinationals 
The multinational firm represents, perhaps, both the most recent transformation in 
ownership structure in global textiles and the most powerful expression of capitalist 
power over labour to date. In the second half of the twentieth century the trend in 
textile firms in the developed capitalist economies was towards horizontal and vertical 
integration, with mergers, take-overs and acquisitions occurring at an astonishing and 
unprecedented rate. Moreover, the biggest textile conglomerates opened up subsidiary 
factories throughout the world, and especially in the underdeveloped capitalist 
economies. Initially, this expansion beyond national boundaries occurred in regional 
spheres of influence – for the USA into South America; for Japan, into the Far East 
underdeveloped economies (such as Indonesia) and for West European countries into 
their colonies and ex-colonies. Clairmonte and Cavanagh estimated that in 1980 
‘control of textile processing is in the hands of a loose oligopoly, with approximately 
35 to 40 large textile corporations exerting a paramount force on world markets’.64 In 
Europe, Courtaulds and Coats became the two largest textile manufacturers by 1980 
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and both invested heavily outside of their base in the UK. Coats employed 66,000 
with interests in 30 countries (including India, Pakistan, Hong Kong, the Philippines 
and Turkey), whilst Courtaulds employed 153,000, with factories in China, Thailand, 
Sri Lanka, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco and the Philippines. By the end of the century, 
about two-thirds of the turnover of these companies was generated outside of the 
UK.65  Similar developments occurred in the USA, across Western Europe and in 
Japan, representing a massive, seismic decline in investment and in employment in 
textiles in the developed capitalist economies. The calculated economic rationality of 
such giant firms is expressed by this statement by the Netherlands textile 
multinational Gamma Holdings NV in 2004: 
Activities that show a structural lack of profitability or no longer fit in with the 
strategy are divested. Risk is limited by spreading the activities over various 
regions and market segments.66 
 
Concurrent with these developments was a major shift by textile capitalists from 
natural fibres into synthetic fibres, starting with nylon and rayon, and this sector 
became the most concentrated and transnational. In 1950, man-made fibres 
constituted just 20% of total world textile output; by the 1980s, it had surpassed 
50%.67  
 
Table 1: The World’s Leading Producers of Synthetic Fibres, 1979 
Firm   Country of   Share of world Share produced 
   Ownership  Fibre Capacity  overseas 
Du Pont  USA    14%   21% 
Akzo   Netherlands     6%   85% 
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Celanese  USA      6%   27% 
Monsanto  USA      6%   17% 
Toray   Japan      4%   30% 
Taijin   Japan      4%   43% 
Hoeschst  Germany     3%   43% 
Rhone-Poulenc France      3%   53% 
Courtaulds  UK      2%   24% 
ICI   UK      2%   76% 
 
Source: V. Cable and B. Baker, World Textile Trade and Production Trends, London 
1983, Table 35, cited in P. Dricken, Global Shift, Industrial Change in a Turbulent 
World, London, 1986, p. 243. 
 
The textile multinationals reaped massive benefits from the shifting of manufacturing 
to under-developed countries. In many cases they enjoyed political privileges, 
subsidies and tax breaks in adopted countries and invariably fewer ‘social’ overheads, 
such as not having to contribute to company pension schemes or insure against 
accident risks. Double standards were common in home-based transnational plants 
compared to subsidiaries, not least on occupational health and environmental controls. 
Amongst the attractions were cheaper transport costs and, crucially, the potential to 
exploit abundant, cheap and poorly organised labour, including child labour, in textile 
factories, but also through sub-contracting and ‘out-sourcing’. The multinationals 
could by-pass the more extensive labour codes of the developed capitalist economies 
and the well-established and powerful trade unions. In turn, these companies forced 
alien management regimes, including Taylorism, upon labour forces (often 
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predominantly female) lacking traditions of collective organisation and the capacity to 
protest as a consequence of over-stocked labour markets and, invariably, state 
repression of unions.68 The expansion of Japanese multinational conglomerates into 
neighbouring South Asian States provides a case in point. The ‘high tech’ factories 
established with Japanese capital in Indonesia were estimated to have made around 
300,000 Indonesians working in the handicraft sector unemployed.69 In Bangladesh, 
workers’ rights were widely ignored by the multinationals, as Nazma Akter, the 
General Secretary of the Bangladesh Independent Garment Workers’ Union 
Federation, noted: 
Freedom of association is a fundamental right that almost all employers in the 
textile industry deny their employees. The big multinationals… are concerned 
about the working environment though not about workers’ basic rights… Long 
working hours and employers’ refusal to grant women maternity leave are 
some of the other recurrent problems… Some employers use the very nasty 
device of forcing workers to sign a letter of resignation at the same time as 
their recruitment contract…70 
 
In the developed market economies, a combination of technological change (including 
computerisation and water jet looms), import penetration and corporate strategy to 
invest in cheaper labour markets (largely in underdeveloped economies) led to 
massive job losses in textile manufacturing. The EEC countries alone lost over one 
million jobs in textiles over the period 1960-1985 (and a further half million in 
clothing). 71  As textile manufacturing capacity and employment levels declined 
sharply in the developed capitalist economies, the textile conglomerates reaped the 
additional benefits of enhanced work discipline and control in their surviving home-
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based plants. The threat of closure and transfer of investment abroad facilitated wage 
cutting, labour discipline and work reorganisation and ‘speed-up’. These deleterious 
effects were more apparent because such corporate strategies impacted severely upon 
specific communities in the developed market economies because of the regional 
nature of textile employment. Hence areas such as Lancashire in England, Paisley in 
Scotland, Quebec in Canada, Massachusetts and the Carolinas in the USA, Lorraine in 
France and the Wallonian region of Belgium have been hit particularly hard.72 In 
Paisley, Scotland, the Coats plant was run down from employing 14,000 in 1960 to 
around 1,000 in 1981, whilst thread production was concentrated in the Madura Coats 
plant in India – employing 22,000 on wages at 13% of those in Scotland.73  One 
activist in the Gap textile plant in Belfast commented on the futility of trying to 
compete with Russian Gap workers paid only 11 cents an hour, with Indonesian Gap 
workers sacked when they tried to form a union and Cambodian Gap employees who 
were shot at during a protest meeting. This had additional advantages for textile 
management in Western Europe and the USA because these developments severely 
undermined a well-unionised, solidaristic work culture, resulting in a collapse in 
union membership, the neutering of strike activity and severe loss of worker 
bargaining power in what remained of textile manufacturing in the developed 
capitalist economies.74 
 
We do need to keep this in perspective, however. Looked at from the point of view of 
the under-nourished, poverty-stricken citizen in the under developed world, textile 
factory employment in a transnational company frequently offered more regular work, 
at higher wages, with more job security and greater individual freedom.75 One study 
comparing the wages of Vietnamese factory workers employed by textile 
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multinationals found annual wages to be roughly double that of workers employed in 
Vietnamese firms. 76  There were also some ‘ethical’ multinationals, such as the 
clothing group Benetton, though like the paternalist millowners in the nineteenth 
century, these were few and far between in the second half of the twentieth century. 
There have also been some attempts recently to address child labour, improve work 
conditions and workers’ rights in the multinationals, with pressure being exerted by 
the I.L.O. and the International Textile, Garment and Leather Workers’ Federation 
(ITGLWF) to establish ‘Codes of Conduct’. However, whilst more work remains to 
be done on such questions, it appears that these countervailing forces have had little 
significant effect on the degenerative impact of the textile multinationals upon 
workers’ rights and work conditions in both the under developed and the developed 
capitalist economies. Significantly, in his recent study of international textile trade 
union efforts to improve conditions for textile workers, Miller has argued that such 
initiatives have proved difficult, not least because of entrenched anti-unionism 
amongst textile employers’ associations and some of the largest multinational textile 
companies. 77  In 2000, Neil Kearney, the General Secretary of the ITGLWF, 
dismissed the ‘Codes of Conduct’ initiated by some textile multinationals as ‘public 
relations exercises’ designed more to maintain the brand image than to genuinely 
improve workers’ rights in developing market economies.78 
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the textile firm and examined the changing patterns of 
employer behaviour and management policies over time, both within the firm and 
collectively. Common features emerge in the narrative as textile firms evolved 
 29
historically from small-scale enterprises and proto-industrial forms servicing local 
markets to large-scale transnational corporations competing in world markets using 
sophisticated power-driven and latterly automated and computerised technology. Over 
time, indirect and loose forms of labour control which allowed for considerable 
degrees of ‘responsible autonomy’ for workers (and especially the skilled artisans) 
gave way to more direct forms of control, tighter discipline and managerial authority. 
Thus coercive or ‘despotic’ forms of labour control clearly dominated in textile firms 
in the 18th and 19th centuries and the national chapters indicate a dogged persistence 
of such methods in many countries deep into the twentieth century. Over time, 
draconian factory regimes gave way to other more consensual methods whereby 
textile firms sought to legitimise their authority, including through the recognition of 
trade unions and extension of collective bargaining. In this process of protecting and 
advancing the interests of capital, employers organisations of textile firms came to 
play a key role, though latterly, across countries such as Britain, the USA, Sweden 
and France there has been a degree of disintegration of collective organisation and 
atomisation of industrial relations. 79  With such transitions, labour management 
methods were transformed, with a major shift within the firm towards more 
bureaucracy, higher levels of supervision and monitoring and incremental deskilling 
and fragmentation of job tasks. 
 
These broad trends in the behaviour of textile firms and their associations, theorised 
as a transition from coercive to more consensual modes of labour management, 
embrace a very wide range of variation in experience and heterogeneity in behaviour, 
both between and within national boundaries. In reality, the prevailing picture at any 
moment in time appears to have been much more uneven, and differing, even 
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sometimes contradictory, policies co-existed (such as scientific management and 
company paternalism). Indeed, this paper has emphasised the wide variety of 
company-level and organised responses in textiles to the rising challenge of worker 
organisation and strikes, ranging from company paternalism, institutionalised 
welfarism, mass production and automation, more flexible combinations of out-
working and factory production, sub-contracting and delegation, outright coercion, 
collusion with the state, collective bargaining and forms of ‘procedural control’. 
Moreover, and importantly, the evidence suggests that the control that textile firms 
sought over labour was rarely complete, frequently challenged and almost everywhere 
subject to mediation as a consequence of workers’ organisation, resistance and 
protest. Textile employers appear to have been rarely omnipotent, frequently divided 
and sometimes completely powerless to withstand fundamental change.  
 
Another major difference was between state-owned enterprises and private, 
competitive textile capitalism. In China, Russia and elsewhere through much of the 
twentieth century textile production came under the aegis of the state, ostensibly 
under more worker-orientated management regimes where production for needs was 
prioritised over the maximisation of profit. Whilst traditional managerial hierarchies 
continued to exist in textile plants in the communist bloc (with enterprise managers in 
Soviet Russia responsible directly to the relevant Minister for Textile Production), the 
degenerative pressures of competing in the world marketplace were nullified by a 
policy of producing for a ‘captive’ internal market itself closed off to external 
competition. Hence, wage standardisation, improved welfare (in a sector dominated 
by female labour) and more job security characterised such work regimes. On the 
other hand, labour control and discipline was maintained by the outlawing of free 
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trade unions and repression of dissenters, and the inefficiencies associated with 
securing inputs (of raw materials and labour especially) often meant a staccato, ‘stop-
go’ cycle of production, with episodes of short-time working followed by periods of 
intense activity and overtime in order to make up the planned production targets. 
Indeed, the imperatives of reaching (and indeed expectations of exceeding) ‘the plan’ 
may well have placed similar pressures upon textile managers and workers as 
experienced by those in the West.   
 
Moreover, in both communist China and Soviet Russia textiles played an important 
role in the industrialisation process with the transition to the factory system 
concentrated in a relatively short time frame – literally over a couple of decades in 
both cases. Whilst there were differences between the centrally planned economies, 
factory-based textile production developed in a distinctively labour-intensive fashion, 
lagging somewhat behind the technological innovations and economies of scale 
evident in the West, with labour discipline sustained through a judicious mix of 
repression, concession and much social ‘conditioning’. 80  In a sense the latter 
substituted as a managerial strategy for the company paternalism of Japanese mills 
(and elsewhere) which worked to cement attachment to the work regime.  Such 
systems merit much more extensive analysis than has been possible here. What is 
apparent too is that the organisation of textile production and the management of 
labour in the centrally planned economies have been changing rapidly since the 1980s 
as these countries opened up to the market.81 China is a case in point. Over the last 
quarter of the twentieth century textile production in China underwent a rapid 
transformation as the regime reorganised the industry along modern lines, re-aligning 
itself to export markets and bringing in much foreign expertise and investment to 
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manage this transition, especially, though not exclusively, recruiting textile capitalists 
from Hong Kong. Shanghai was the fulcrum of this transformation and the main 
centre of the new export-orientated textile factories.82 This has attracted much interest 
from the dominant West European and U.S. textile multinationals, including DuPont, 
who have invested heavily in textile manufacture in China, especially in artificial 
fibre manufacture.83  
 
What is evident, then, is that textile firms across the globe adapted and developed 
their organisational forms and labour relations policies in an organic, experimental 
and incremental fashion in response to product and labour market pressures, 
technological change, the growth of trade unions and other prevailing circumstances. 
Organisational forms and strategies were also influenced by national culture, values 
and by national institutional factors, including labour law and government policy. 
This produced prevailing, common tendencies within capitalist textile production 
globally, including the key transitions towards the bureaucratisation of authority and 
work within the firm, the delegation of aspects of labour management externally, to 
employers’ organisations, and the shift towards collective bargaining with labour as a 
key mode of legitimising the authority of the firm. However, it must be emphasised 
again that within these broad and converging patterns what is also evident is the 
diversity of textile firms’ labour relations policies. Evidently textile firms exercised 
strategic choice and much divergence, division and lack of consensus existed within 
the ranks of textile capitalists globally, and frequently within national boundaries. 
More research is needed to disentangle this and to understand both the patterns and 
the determinants of textile firms’ behaviour in labour relations. However, what is 
apparent is that textile firms’ labour management policies varied widely across time 
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and space; that workers and the state were powerful agencies influencing the 
strategies of textile firms and that technology and markets were important 
determinants of the policies of textile firms and textile employers’ organisations. 
Whilst recognising the plurality of organisational forms and strategies, widely 
differing trajectories and the heterogeneity of textile capitalism worldwide, 
nonetheless it is important in the final analysis to appreciate the central importance of 
the profit motive and the market in determining the key historical mutations in the 
textile firm globally, from merchant-capitalist, through the family-owned enterprise of 
the early factory system, to the joint-stock corporations and the vertically and 
horizontally concentrated multinational conglomerates that now dominate world 
textile production.  
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